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Abstract 11 
Present day and future social vulnerability, flood risk and disadvantage across the UK are 12 
explored using the UK Future Flood Explorer.  In doing so, new indices of neighbourhood 13 
flood vulnerability and social flood risk are introduced and used to provide a quantitative 14 
comparison of the flood risks faced by more and less socially vulnerable neighbourhoods.  15 
The results show the concentrated nature of geographic flood disadvantage.  For example, 16 
ten local authorities account for fifty percent of the most socially vulnerable people that live 17 
in flood prone areas.  The results also highlight the systematic nature of flood disadvantage.  18 
For example, flood risks are higher in socially vulnerable communities than elsewhere; this is 19 
shown to be particularly the case in coastal areas, economically struggling cities and 20 
dispersed rural communities.  Results from a re-analysis of the Environment Agency’s Long-21 
Term Investment Scenarios (for England) suggests a long-term economic case for improving 22 
the protection afforded to the most socially vulnerable communities; a finding that 23 
reinforces the need to develop a better understanding of flood risk in socially vulnerable 24 
communities if flood risk management efforts are to deliver fair outcomes.  In response to 25 
these findings the paper advocates an approach to flood risk management that emphasizes 26 
Rawlsian principles of preferentially targeting risk reduction for the most socially vulnerable 27 
and avoids a process of prioritisation based upon strict utilitarian or purely egalitarian 28 
principles.   29 
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Introduction 32 
Developing a better understanding of flood vulnerability in disadvantaged communities is a 33 
prerequisite for delivering a socially just (i.e. fair) approach to prioritising flood risk 34 
management (FRM) efforts.  Such an approach emphasises Rawlsian principles of 35 
preferentially targeting risk reduction for the most socially vulnerable, and avoids a process 36 
of prioritisation based upon strict utilitarian or purely egalitarian principles (Johnson et al., 37 
2007), and is recognised as a central component of a strategic approach to flood risk 38 
management (Sayers et al, 2014). 39 
Social vulnerability in the context of floods relates to how flooding impacts on, and creates 40 
losses in, people’s wellbeing (Tapsell et al., 2004, Lindley et al., 2011, England and Knox, 41 
2015).  Delivering socially just FRM thus requires two central research questions to be 42 
addressed.  The first relates to the geographic nature of flood disadvantage and the ability 43 
to identify those communities where high levels of social vulnerability combine with a large 44 
number of people exposed to flooding.  The second relates to the systemic nature of flood 45 
disadvantage and the ability to assess the degree to which FRM policy (and its 46 
implementation in practice) can be consider successful in delivering socially just outcomes 47 
(as expressed by the comparative risks faced by the most socially vulnerable communities 48 
when compared to the average). 49 
Following a short discussion of the concept of ‘fairness’, the analysis presented here 50 
explores the geographic and systemic aspects of flood disadvantage today and how these 51 
may change in the future.  In doing so, the influences of changes exogenous to FRM (e.g. 52 
climate change and population change) and influences that are largely endogenous to FRM 53 
(e.g. FRM policy and its broader impacts on issues such as insurance) are considered.  Both 54 
present-day and future flood disadvantage are explored through a quantified analysis at a 55 
UK scale (using the UK-Future Flood Explorer, UK FFE, Sayers et al., 2015, 2016).  Based on 56 
this evidence, a series of policy recommendations are made with the aim of promoting 57 
social justice and improving resilience in the most socially vulnerable communities across 58 
the UK. 59 
What is meant by a ‘fair’ approach to FRM 60 
Notions of social justice have long been debated by philosophers and theologians.  The 61 
purpose of this paper is not to provide new philosophical debate but rather to consider how 62 
these concepts inform (or not) FRM and how they can be used to frame a quantitative 63 
national assessment of ‘fairness’.  Interpreting social justice in the context of FRM is not 64 
however straightforward.  This is because the nature of ‘justice’ is disputed, and can be seen 65 
from many perspectives (e.g. Vojinović and Abbott, 2012).  Three broad theories are 66 
however generally accepted as central to these discussions (Johnson et al., 2007, Penning-67 
Rowsell et al., 2016, Sayers et al., 2017).   68 
First utilitarianism, as introduced by Jeremy Bentham, 1748-1832 and John Stuart Mill 1806-69 
1873, provides the underpinning advocacy for a benefit cost approach to determine the 70 
worthwhileness of an investment in a single intervention measure (or portfolio of 71 
measures).  In FRM practice however utilitarianism often defaults to a rather narrowly 72 
3 
 
defined cost benefit approach that tends to consider only those benefits and costs that can 73 
be readily monetised and often fails to take account of complex externalities, such as the 74 
impact on ecosystem health (e.g. Sayers, 2017) and the wider social impacts of flooding (e.g. 75 
the significant costs of mental health impacts from floods may still fall on the public purse 76 
but to other government departments than those financing FRM, Waite et al., 2017).  The 77 
implementation of FRM measures is often criticized because of this narrow focus and its 78 
tendency to suggest that it is preferable to maximise the collective outcome for the many to 79 
the detriment of the few; thereby prioritising efficiency over all other considerations. 80 
Secondly, egalitarianism, or rights based theories of justice, recognise that the framework of 81 
society (its laws, institutions, policies, etc.) give rise to variations in the distribution of 82 
benefits and burdens across the members of that society (e.g. Sen, 1992).  Egalitarianism is 83 
concerned with this distribution (distributive justice) and seeks to ensure that all citizens 84 
have equal opportunity to have their risk managed and have equal voice in decision-making 85 
processes and governance (procedural justice).  Both of these general propositions influence 86 
FRM.  In some countries, such as the Netherlands, the principle of ‘solidarity’ seeks to 87 
provide a high level of flood safety for all individuals (e.g. van Alphen, 2014) despite the 88 
implications for resource efficiency.  In UK, the combination of the significant spatial 89 
heterogeneity in the flooding process, the long history of urbanisation and the associated 90 
significant sunk investment in flood defences means that such an approach, even if 91 
achievable, would be either grossly inefficient (diverting resources from more beneficial 92 
activities) or not meaningful for those affected (e.g. if the minimum level of safety would 93 
need to be set very low, to be practical everywhere (Defra, 2004)).  This does not mean 94 
however that no effort is made to maximise the number of people that have their risk 95 
managed.  The incremental Benefit:Cost Ratio (iBCR) test applied in England, for example, 96 
examines the marginal increase in benefits compared with the marginal increase in costs 97 
associated with delivering a progressively higher standard of protection (Defra, 2014b).  This 98 
approach attempts to support utilitarian efficiency and distributive equality by directing 99 
limited national investment towards maximising the number of properties and their 100 
occupants provided with a minimum degree of protection, and away from providing higher 101 
standards in a few locations (despite the latter achieving a greater economic return). 102 
Finally, a Rawlsian perspective promotes a theory of justice in which ‘fairness’ plays a 103 
central role (Rawls, 1971).  Rawls argues that a ‘fair’ approach seeks to maximise the 104 
minimum outcomes by making the choice that produces the greatest return for the least 105 
advantaged (the so-called ‘maximin rule’).  This is a powerful concept that suggests even if 106 
considerations of efficiency indicate differently, it may be ‘fair(er)’ to spend taxpayers’ 107 
money unevenly if it maximises the benefits for those who have little welfare resource.  The 108 
delivery of forecast and warning services is often implicitly Rawlsian, for example, typically 109 
providing information in multiple languages and prioritising the physically disabled 110 
(Environment Agency, 2009).  The only direct expression of Rawlsian principles within the 111 
FRM investment decision-making process however is in the formula used to determine the 112 
maximum contribution to a specific FRM scheme from general taxation.  Through the Flood 113 
Defence Grant-in-Aid (FDGiA) formula (Defra, 2011) preferential weighting is given to 114 
schemes that reduce flood risk to deprived households (as defined by the Index of Multiple 115 
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Deprivation)b.  The outcomes from investment in FRM for the 20% most deprived 116 
households are also explicitly monitored at a national level (i.e. Outcome Measures 2ac).  No 117 
consideration, however, is currently given to degree to which this outcome is proportionally 118 
fair.  It is also the case that HM Treasury guidance (that sets out the governing principles of 119 
economic appraisal to be used by UK central government, HM Treasury, 2003) is based on 120 
the concept of welfare economics and provides an opportunity to incorporate equity 121 
weightings, noting that the distributional implications of alternative options must be 122 
‘considered during an appraisal and promotes the use of distributional weights to adjust 123 
explicitly for distributional impacts in the benefit cost analysis’.  Such adjustments are 124 
however seldom made in FRM practice.   125 
Although these theories have been explored in a number of projects (e.g. Johnson et al., 126 
2007; Nada-Rajah, 2010, Kind et al., 2017), and ‘fairness’ has been recognised as part of 127 
‘good’ strategic FRM (Defra, 2013; Sayers et al., 2014), there has been little quantification of 128 
the degree to which FRM delivers ‘fair’ outcomes for socially vulnerable communities and 129 
how climate change and current adaptation efforts may influence these outcomes.  The 130 
need to address this latter topic is increasingly recognised at a global scale (e.g. Hallegatte 131 
et al., 2016) as well as within the UK and is the motivation for the analysis presented here. 132 
Why assess ‘fairness’ of flood risk management at a national scale 133 
National assessments of flood risk are widely recognised as providing important evidence to 134 
inform policy decisions (e.g. Penning-Rowsell, 2015).  Such assessments have been pursued 135 
actively by the Environment Agency since 2002 (covering England and Wales, e.g. Sayers et 136 
al., 2002, Hall et al., 2003) and their predecessors since 1998 (Burgess et al., 2000), and 137 
more recently by Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) since 2011.  This 138 
importance arises because of the role of a national level determination of risk in setting the 139 
pace of adaptation and shaping the policy response and resource inputs (e.g. Environment 140 
Agency, 2009; Defra, 2011).  Their importance has been further strengthened through the 141 
Climate Change Act 2008 that requires a UK-wide Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA) to 142 
be undertaken on a five-yearly cycle that is independent of national FRM authorities but 143 
which influences the scale and focus of adaptation measures (Committee on Climate 144 
Change, 2016).  The assessment of flood risk at a national scale is consequentially the 145 
fundamental basis for policy making and the directing of risk reducing investment.   146 
The Climate Change Risk Assessment - Future Flooding Studies (Sayers et al., 2015), for 147 
example, suggests that in a +4oC climate future (an extreme but plausible assumption) flood 148 
risk is likely to increase despite on-going efforts to adapt and encourage the adoption of an 149 
‘enhanced whole systems’ approach to adaptation.  The evidence provided to national 150 
policy makers has, to date, however included very limited insight into either geographic or 151 
systemic flood disadvantage and the CCRA says little about future flood disadvantage or the 152 
policy responses that may be needed to specifically target socially vulnerable communities.  153 
The absence of a social justice lens also permeates the Environment Agency’s programme of 154 
                                                     
b
 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/297377/LIT_9142_dd8bbe.pdf Accessed June 2016 
c
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140328084622/http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/research/planning/122070.aspx Accessed January 2017 
5 
 
flood and coastal erosion risk management for England.  This plan sets out a six-year 155 
investment plan (2015-2021) for capital spending on FRM, which includes £2.3 billion of 156 
public expenditure (Defra, 2014a) yet there is limited alignment between planned 157 
investment and areas where high levels of vulnerability and exposure combine (England and 158 
Knox, 2015).   159 
The changing context of flood risk management and its potential implications for social 160 
justice 161 
The focus of FRM is changing, away from a narrow economic risk focus to one that seeks to 162 
deliver broader social and ecosystem resilience (e.g. Sayers et al., 2014, 2017) based on an 163 
understanding of the risks, uncertainties and vulnerabilities (Sayers et al., 2016 – 164 
Supplementary Figure S1).  The national Flood Resilience Community Pathfinders Scheme 165 
(2013-15), for example, sought to stimulate approaches to community FRM that better 166 
enable communities to move towards greater resilience to flooding (Defra, 2013).  An early 167 
review of this programme however highlighted some of the difficulties in understanding 168 
what is meant by resilience and how this understanding shapes the nature of the solutions 169 
proposed, noting ‘the way resilience is framed will lead to different actions and emphases’ 170 
(Twigger-Ross et al., 2014).  The relationship between social vulnerability and resilience also 171 
emerged as a central message from this review, with the suggestion that community 172 
networks (between individuals and more formal organisations) play a central role in both. 173 
The political framework within which FRM is delivered is also changing.  The ongoing 174 
process of devolution (i.e. to Scotland and to Wales but also to cities, such as Manchester) 175 
has the potential to alter the powers and competencies at a local and national scale and 176 
hence the way issues of social justice are embedded in FRM investment decisions.   177 
Method of assessment 178 
To explore the degree to which FRM in the UK can be considered social just, the analysis 179 
here seeks to understand both the geographic and systemic nature of flood disadvantage 180 
and identify those neighbourhoods at greatest flood disadvantage now and in the future 181 
(through to the 2020s, 2050s and 2080s) across the UK.  In doing so, the analysis 182 
differentiates the results by country (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland), flood 183 
source (coastal, fluvial and surface water flooding), urban and rural settings and city regions 184 
in decline.   185 
The large spatial scale of the analysis, the multiple future scenarios (Supplementary Figure 186 
S2) and the portfolio of FRM adaptation measures to be considered (Supplementary Figure 187 
S3) mean it is difficult to explore all the relevant combinations using conventional numerical 188 
modelling approaches (a challenge recognised in Kwakkel et al., 2013).  Instead, the 189 
approach used here builds upon lessons from past national scale studies undertaken in the 190 
UK (e.g.  Evans et al., 2004a&b, Sayers et al., 2015) and insights from international research 191 
(e.g.  Klijn et al., 2004 and 2014, Bouwer et al., 2010) to allow a rapid evaluation of the 192 
effects of climate and population change and adaptation using the UK Future Flood Explorer 193 
(FFE) – Supplementary Figure S4.   194 
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The UK FFE uses available data on flood hazard, exposure and vulnerability to develop a 195 
credible representation of the behaviour of the UK flood risk system (that takes account of 196 
the flood defences where they exist).  This approach was shown to support credible policy 197 
insights as part of the UK CCRA (Sayers et al., 2015, 2016) and has been revised and 198 
enhanced in three areas for application here: the spatial resolution of the analysis, the 199 
characterisation of flood social vulnerability, and adaptation to flood risk differentiated by 200 
the vulnerability of the communities affected.  These advances are briefly discussed below. 201 
Spatial resolution of the analysis: the ‘neighbourhood’ unit and adaptations 202 
The underlying spatial resolution of the flood hazard data used within the UK FFE varies 203 
from 2m-50m (depending upon flood source – coastal, fluvial or surface water (pluvial) and 204 
location).  The data on exposure is based on residential point datasets (and hence has the 205 
resolution of a single property).  The results however are not necessarily credible at these 206 
scales because of localised issues that may or may not be well reflected in the supporting 207 
data.  The concept of the ‘neighbourhood’ is therefore used as a small, but locally 208 
aggregated, spatial unit to bring together flood hazard and exposure with census based 209 
social vulnerability data.  The spatial scale of a ‘neighbourhoods’ varies across the UK and is 210 
based upon census Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in England and Wales, Super 211 
Output Areas (SOAs) in Northern Ireland and the Data Zones (DZs) in Scotland (as defined in 212 
the 2011 Census).  This definition yields a total of 42,619 neighbourhoods with the average 213 
population in each varying slightly by country: 1600 in England, 760 in Scotland, 1600 in 214 
Wales and 2000 in Northern Ireland. 215 
For each neighbourhood, an Impact Curve is generated relating the return period of a 216 
current or future flood event to the magnitude of the impact (i.e. a loss of well-being as 217 
defined by one of several metrics, Supplementary Figure S5).  Each Impact Curve is then 218 
manipulated within the FFE to represent the influence of climate and population change as 219 
well as adaptations to flood risk within a given neighbourhood (Supplementary Figure S6).  220 
For example, to represent climate change the Impact Curve is moved to the left along the 221 
return period axis.  The raising of flood defences, however, would act to reduce risk and is 222 
represented by shifting the Impact Curve in the opposite direction.   223 
This approach provides a significant increase in resolution from the analysis undertaken as 224 
part of the CCRA (based there upon the much larger Calculation Areas, defined using 225 
coastline and river boundaries to subdivide the floodplain, and 1km squares elsewhere) and 226 
represents an evolution of the previous present day assessments of flood disadvantage (in 227 
England, based upon Middle Layer Super Output Areas, MSOAs (Lindley et al., 2011), and in 228 
Scotland based upon Data Zones (Kazmierczak et al., 2015)). 229 
The characterisation of flood vulnerability 230 
UK FRM policy typically considers social vulnerability through the lens of deprivation (as 231 
indicated by the Index of Multiple Deprivation, DCLG, 2015) and this view provides the basis 232 
of the analysis presented in the CCRA (Sayers et al., 2015).  A focus on deprivation however 233 
does not necessarily reflect a community’s vulnerability to a flood (although flood 234 
vulnerability is significantly influenced by income deprivation, as clearly demonstrated by 235 
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Tapsell et al., (2002)).  To overcome this shortcoming, and build on the characterisation of 236 
flood vulnerability advanced by Lindley et al., (2011) and more recently by Kazmierczak et 237 
al., (2015), a new measure is introduced here: the Neighbourhood Flood Vulnerability Index 238 
(NFVI).  The NFVI expresses the neighbourhood’s characteristics that influence the potential 239 
to experience a loss of well-being when exposed to a flood and over which flood 240 
management policy has limited or no control.  In doing so, the NFVI builds upon previous 241 
studies (Tapsell et al., 2002; Lindley et al., 2011; Twigger-Ross et al., 2014; Kazmierczak et 242 
al., 2015) and requires consideration of five characteristics to provide a single vulnerability 243 
index at a neighbourhood scale (Figure 1). 244 
The assessment of each characteristic is based upon one or more indicators (e.g. age, health 245 
etc.) that are, in turn, based upon one or more supporting variables (Table 1).  Each 246 
indicator is normalised to a z score (derived by subtracting the mean value and dividing by 247 
the standard deviation).  If a variable is already in the form of a rank (e.g. as is the Index of 248 
Multiple Deprivation), the equivalent z score is determined by assuming the rank is drawn 249 
from a normal distribution and calculating the number of standard deviations from the 250 
mean associated with that rank.  The resulting z scores are then equally weighted to 251 
estimate each of the five characteristics (Susceptibility; Ability to Prepare; etc.).  The only 252 
exceptions to this are the supporting variables associate with ‘direct flood experience’ and 253 
‘primary school aged children’ (Table 1; e1 and n3).  These variables act to reduce social 254 
vulnerability (e.g. those with experience know how to cope better than those without; 255 
families with schoolchildren tend to have more local contacts (Tapsell et al., 2002; Twigger-256 
Ross et al., 2014)), and hence a negative weighting is applied (to reduce rather than increase 257 
the relative vulnerability of one neighbourhood compared to another).  The resulting values 258 
for each characteristic or indicator are then themselves transformed into a z score, and 259 
summed, with equal weighting.  The final z score is calculated based on these results and 260 
used as the NFVI (Supplementary Figure S7). 261 
The differential capacity to adapt 262 
Good FRM adopts a portfolio of responses (Evans et al., 2004a&b; Sayers et al., 2014) to 263 
provide a ‘whole system’ management response (an approach that includes actions to 264 
manage the source, pathways and receptors of risk, Sayers et al., 2002).  In the context of a 265 
national analysis the effectiveness of individual adaptation measures is however often 266 
considered to be independent of the vulnerability of those at risk (as for example within the 267 
CCRA, Sayers et al., 2015).  To overcome this deficiency, the analysis presented here 268 
differentiates the effectiveness of individual FRM adaptation measures based on 269 
neighbourhood vulnerability (where there is evidence to do so).  For example, despite the 270 
Flood Defence Grant-In-Aid (FDGiA) formula prioritising deprived areas in England and 271 
Wales (Defra, 2011) and the release of high level statements that aim to prioritise the most 272 
vulnerable across the UK, there is some evidence to suggest that the most vulnerable 273 
neighbourhoods are less well protected than others (England and Knox, 2015), with 274 
investment focused in urban areas (and away from rural areas) and towards more affluent 275 
areas (and away from deprived areas).  This is reflected here in the assumed future 276 
adaptation of defence measures.  There is also anecdotal evidence to suggest that in inner-277 
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city areas (where urban flooding and drainage is significant) a differential in the retrofitting 278 
of Sustainable Urban Drainage (SUDS) measures may exist.  This is reflected in the analysis 279 
here by assuming no retrofitting takes place in more vulnerable communities (compared to 280 
10% elsewhere, ASC, 2014).   281 
Spatial planning and development control are also important FRM measures and population 282 
growth and associated development are important drivers of future risk.  Analysis of new 283 
residential developments (in England only) in the period 2008-2014 undertaken here 284 
suggests that the percentage of new properties built within the fluvial and coastal floodplain 285 
is around 14 per cent in the most vulnerable areas (defined by the top 20 per cent of 286 
neighbourhoods by NFVI) and 11 per cent in less vulnerable areas (Sayers et al., 2017).  This 287 
differential in current planning outcomes is assumed to persist into the future and is 288 
therefore carried forward into the analysis. 289 
Property level protection measures (PLP), warning services and insurance also all provide 290 
important FRM contributions, but all three can be difficult for the most vulnerable to access.  291 
Regarding property level measures, evidence suggests that the uptake by the most 292 
vulnerable in existing developments is likely to be significantly lower than in the population 293 
as whole (National Flood Forum, 2012).  There may be multiple reasons for this including: 294 
 property level measures can be expensive which may rule out installation for people 295 
on low incomes (National Flood Forum, 2012); 296 
 the process of applying for a grant is bureaucratic and cumbersome (National Flood 297 
Forum, 2016);  298 
 grants may be insufficient to encourage take up by the most vulnerable (based on 299 
evidence from the case studies undertaken in this research); 300 
 tenants in rented accommodation have a reduced ability and incentive to install 301 
property levels measures; and  302 
 developing an awareness of flood risk within transient communities maybe more 303 
difficult. 304 
In combination, these barriers mean it is likely that retro-fitting of PLP measures in the most 305 
vulnerable neighbourhoods will be significantly less than elsewhere, and this differential is 306 
carried forward into our analysis.  There is however little existing evidence that would 307 
suggest the uptake of such measures within new developments is any different in more and 308 
less vulnerable neighbourhoods.   309 
There is also some evidence to suggest that social vulnerability influences a community’s 310 
ability to respond to a warning (Thrush et al., 2005).  In part, this is already reflected in the 311 
NFVI (Table 1: f1, f2, k1) but social vulnerability can also influence the effectiveness of such 312 
measures due to, for example:  313 
 Barriers to receiving the warning: many households (particularly low-income 314 
households) are no longer choosing to maintain a telephone landline but instead rely 315 
upon mobile technologies (see Money.co.uk (2017).  This can create complications in 316 
trying to contact households to convey flood warnings, largely because there is no 317 
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published list of mobile phone numbers as there is for landlines.  Loss of power 318 
during a flood can also prevent communication, as mobile telephones (and cordless 319 
landlines) require power to charge batteries (Pitt, 2007).  Transient and travelling 320 
communities may also be difficult to reach. 321 
 Accessing the content of warnings: Minority ethnic groups for whom English or 322 
Welsh is not their first language may be less able to respond (Thrush et al., 2005).   323 
 Awareness of the need to be ‘flood aware’: One of the factors that has been shown 324 
to have the greatest impact on levels of “awareness” is lack of previous flooding 325 
experience (Thrush et al., 2005).   326 
In combination, these challenges are assumed to lead to lower rates of uptake of warning 327 
services and the action taken in response to the warnings to be less effective at reducing 328 
economic damage in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods when compared to less 329 
vulnerable neighbourhoods.   330 
Private insurance underpins FRM policies in the UK.  This is one of the few FRM policies 331 
whose measures are universally applied across the UK (National Flood Forum, 2012).  332 
Penetration is, however, uneven.  Based on the government’s Household Expenditure 333 
Survey and evidence from its own members, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) 334 
estimate that the uptake of insurance in the UK is such that 93 per cent of all homeowners 335 
have buildings insurance that covers the structure of their home, but this falls to 85 per cent 336 
of the poorest 10 per cent of households purchasing their own property.  The differential in 337 
contents insurance is much greater.  Some 75 per cent of all households have contents 338 
insurance, but less than half of the poorest 10 per cent of households and even fewer who 339 
are tenants have this protection.  This prompted Watkiss et al., 2016 to note that “while 340 
most owner occupiers have building insurance, there are much lower levels of contents 341 
insurance among tenants, with many in the lowest income decile having no insurance at all”.   342 
Since April 2016 Flood-Re has created a pool into which all insurers contribute to subsidise 343 
the insurance premiums of those at greatest risk (Defra, 2014a).  Householders purchasing 344 
flood insurance will not know whether they are in this pool or not, since they will deal with 345 
their conventional insurance company, but that company will cede the policy and the 346 
liability for claims to the Flood-Re pool if the cost of insurance exceeds certain thresholds 347 
and certain eligibility criteria are met (including excluding properties built after 1st January 348 
2009).  The result is intended to make flood insurance affordable, including for example 349 
capped premiums linked to Council Tax bandingsd.  However, in high risk areas, it is unclear 350 
whether Flood Re has been successful in improving insurance uptake in the most vulnerable 351 
neighbourhoods and it does nothing to assist the uninsured.  It is also the case that Flood Re 352 
has a life of only twenty-five years after which flood insurance will become fully risk-353 
reflective.  Watkiss et al., 2016 discusses how this transition to market prices will, in the 354 
longer term, lead to substantially higher premiums for those at risk, and those at most risk 355 
will pay much more than at present.  This transition to an actuarial accounting process could 356 
further discourage the most vulnerable from accessing insurance. 357 
                                                     
d
 http://www.floodre.co.uk/industry/how-it-works/eligibility/ 
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To establish a credible representation of the role of insurance within the analysis, and how it 358 
may be more or less effective in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods, several issues have 359 
necessarily been considered and partially modelled.  First, regarding uptake by income, 360 
there is a marked difference in penetration levels with different levels of disposable income 361 
such that there is a 47.5 per cent difference between the lowest and highest income deciles 362 
(ONS, 2015).  Secondly, insurance has lower levels of penetration across households in 363 
rented accommodation (ONS, 2015) – although local authorities and housing associations 364 
would typically be responsible for any structural repairs following a flood, and in the private 365 
rented sector the landlord will be responsible for structural repairs.  Therefore, the 366 
insurance position of the landlord is what is critical in terms of structural repair.  This 367 
however is not considered further here.   368 
Risk and vulnerability metrics 369 
As Cutter et al (2010) in the USA and Walker and Burningham (2011) in the UK have shown, 370 
the way in which flood risk, vulnerability and resilience are measured is crucial to the way 371 
they are understood and managed.  Several new risk metrics are used here to unpack flood 372 
disadvantage.  The first, used at the neighbourhood scale, is the Social Flood Risk Index 373 
(SFRI).  This is used to identify those areas where the largest number of the most socially 374 
vulnerable people are most frequently flooded (i.e.   return period, on average, of 1 in 75 375 
years or more frequent).  The SFRI therefore directly supports an understanding of 376 
geographic flood disadvantage (defined earlier) and is estimated at both a neighbourhood 377 
scale and as an individual ‘average’ as follows:  378 
 Social flood risk index (SFRI) helps identify those areas where many vulnerable people, as 379 
defined by the NFVI, are exposed to flooding and is calculated as the product of the NFVI 380 
and the annual expected number of people flooded as follows:   381 
 382 
 383 
 384 
 Social flood risk index: Individual (iSFRI) helps identify those neighbourhoods where the 385 
vulnerability of those exposed is high (even when only a few may be exposed) and is 386 
calculated simply by dividing the SFRI by the neighbourhood floodplain population. 387 
Secondly a metric of Relative Economic Pain (REP) is introduced in recognition of the varying 388 
coping capacity between more affluent and low income families.  This metric captures the 389 
relationship between uninsured damages and household income: the larger the former in 390 
relation to the latter, the greater the REP.  The REP builds upon previous research touching 391 
on issues of outrage (Evans et al., 2004a,b; Sayers et al., 2014) to express the ‘relative pain’ 392 
of a risk and is defined here as the uninsured loss (represented by one minus the insurance 393 
penetration) times the EAD on the floodplain, divided by total income on the floodplain: 394 
 395 
Where I = percentage of the loss covered by insurance, EAD = Expected Annual Damages, 396 
and Income = household annual income. 397 
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The validity of approach  398 
The validation of any analysis of risk is difficult to determine, in part because flood events 399 
are rare and flood systems are non-stationary (Sayers et al., 2016).  The validity of any 400 
analysis therefore relies upon acknowledging assumptions and limitations and gaining 401 
confidence that the analysis is credible at the scales of interest and in the context of the 402 
objectives.   403 
To provide appropriate confidence in the analysis presented here, three important aspects 404 
are discussed below.  First, it is assumed that the input data used by the FFE (including, but 405 
not limited to, flood hazard, defence standards and conditions, property counts, census 406 
data) is credible at the scales of interest and in the context of the project objectives.  This is 407 
reasonable given all the datasets are routinely used by various national and local 408 
organisations (Defra; the EA; SEPA), despite recognised controversy regarding the absolute 409 
values of some of the datasets (such as data based upon the National Flood Risk Assessment 410 
in England (Penning-Rowsell, 2014, 2015, 2016)).   411 
Secondly, to provide valid estimates of risk the FFE must provide a faithful reproduction of 412 
the underlying data.  To provide confidence that this is the case the results of the FFE have 413 
been previously compared to standalone estimates of the number of properties nationally 414 
at significant risk and the resultant expected annual damages (as produced by Environment 415 
Agency’s National Flood Risk Assessment, and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency 416 
(SEPA).  Such comparisons have confirmed the ability of the FFE to produce known results 417 
(Sayers et al., 2015).   418 
Thirdly, to provide confidence that the extension of the analysis to represent 419 
neighbourhood vulnerability and using social flood risk indices is justified, three additional 420 
activities have been undertaken (Sayers et al., 2017): 421 
 Engagement with an Advisory Group: The analysis has been scrutinised as they have 422 
emerged by an extensive Joseph Rowntree Foundation convened Advisory Group.   423 
 Engagement with national policy leads: Policy leads from England, Wales, Scotland 424 
and Northern Ireland have each been engaged to discuss the role of social justice in 425 
current policy approaches to FRM and the anticipated direction of travel.   426 
 Local case studies and review: Four local case studies (in Boston, Cumbria, Blaenau 427 
and in York, the last undertaken in association with Robotham, 2016) have been 428 
used to ground-truth the estimates of social vulnerability and social flood risk.  These 429 
discussions provided confidence that the relative distribution of social vulnerability 430 
was indeed locally representative (Sayers et al., 2017). 431 
To develop a UK wide view of adaptation to flood risk, the individual measures have been 432 
chosen to be a reasonable representation of current approaches across England, Wales, 433 
Scotland and Northern Ireland.  For example, it is assumed that analysis of recent 434 
development in England (2008-14) is indicative of the effectiveness of spatial planning 435 
across the UK.  This is of course a simplification and fails to reflect the full variation in 436 
national policies between England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as the local 437 
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context within which risks are managed, but nonetheless is considered reasonable in the 438 
context of the national level analysis presented here.   439 
Discussion of results 440 
To understand the multiple and important messages that emerge from this analysis four 441 
aspects are considered: 442 
(i) The relationship between social vulnerability, floodplain population and exposure to 443 
frequent flooding. 444 
(ii) The economic risks faced by the socially vulnerable and the influence of differentials 445 
in income and insurance penetration. 446 
(iii) The relationship between cities in relative economic decline, deprivation and flood 447 
disadvantage. 448 
(iv) The evidence of greater investment in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods 449 
Floodplain population, vulnerability and exposure to frequent flooding  450 
The situation todaye  451 
Today, approximately 6.4m people in the UK live in areas prone to fluvial, coastal and 452 
surface water flooding, with around 1.5 million of these (23.4%) living in the 20% most 453 
vulnerable neighbourhoods (as defined by the NFVI – Supplementary Table S1).  Of the 1.8 454 
million people living in the coastal floodplain, 33% are within the 20% most vulnerable 455 
neighbourhoods and 10% in the 5% most vulnerable neighbourhoods (by NFVI).  Of those 456 
exposed to frequent flooding, the majority (67%; 1.3m) live in the most socially vulnerable 457 
neighbourhoods (top 20% by NFVI) (Supplementary Table S2).   458 
The proportion of socially vulnerable neighbourhoods exposed to flooding varies across the 459 
four nations.  In Northern Ireland, 55% of the population exposed to flooding live in the top 460 
20% of neighbourhoods by NFVI and 25% of the total population exposed to frequent 461 
flooding are in most vulnerable communities (the top 5% by NFVI).  This represents a 462 
significant systemic flood disadvantage.  The disproportionality is less elsewhere (in Scotland 463 
9% of the floodplain population live in the top 5% communities by NFVI; in England 5%; and 464 
in Wales 3%). 465 
Seventy-five local authorities (approximately one fifth of the UK total) account for 50% of 466 
those living in flood prone areas.  The concentration becomes more marked when the most 467 
vulnerable neighbourhoods (top 5% by NFVI) are considered, with over 50% of the 468 
population exposed to flooding in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods located in just ten 469 
local authorities (Hull, Boston, Belfast, Birmingham, East Lindsey, Glasgow, Leicester, North 470 
East Lincolnshire, Swale District, and Tower Hamlets).  Figure 2 illustrates this clustering and 471 
highlights concentrations of people in vulnerable neighbourhoods on the floodplain in 472 
Scotland’s central belt, Belfast, the Humber, Lincolnshire, Birmingham, South Wales, and the 473 
Severn and Thames Estuaries.   474 
                                                     
e
 Dateline Autumn 2016. 
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The drivers of social vulnerability (as in Table 1) are, in general, similar across all sources of 475 
flooding.  In coastal settings, however limited service availability (Table 1: s1 to s4) plays an 476 
enhanced role and is a key contributor to the high levels of vulnerability observed, along 477 
with physical mobility (m1 to m3) and information use (f1 and f2) (Supplementary Figure 478 
S8). 479 
In the future   480 
The number of people living in flood prone areas is set to rise (by 45% to 10.8m people by 481 
the 2080s, assuming a high population growth, Supplementary Figure S9).  By the 2080s 482 
6.4m people will be exposed to frequent flooding, up from 2m today (assuming a +4oC 483 
climate future and a continuation of the current level of adaptation).  In socially vulnerable 484 
neighbourhoods the increase is equally dramatic, increasing from 451,000 today to 1.4m by 485 
the 2080s and disproportional exposure to flooding of those living in socially vulnerable 486 
neighbourhoods that exists today continues (Supplementary Figure S10).  Those living in the 487 
most socially vulnerable neighbourhoods exposed to fluvial flooding see their risk increase 488 
at a faster rate (increasing from 24,000 to 63,000; +263%). 489 
Expected annual damages and the influence of income and insurance 490 
The situation today  491 
Expected Annual (economic) Damages (EAD) across the UK is an estimated £351 million 492 
(residential property only), with the majority generated in England (79%, £277 million).  The 493 
contribution from elsewhere in the UK is however more significant when considered in the 494 
context of the most socially vulnerable neighbourhoods (Supplementary Figure S11).  This is 495 
most significant in Northern Ireland where the 20% most vulnerable neighbourhoods 496 
account for 67% of the EAD (in Scotland the equivalent figure is 22%, in England 22% and in 497 
Wales 26%).  Therefore, although Northern Ireland accounts for only 2% of the UK EAD 498 
when all neighbourhoods are included, when considered from the perspective of the most 499 
vulnerable neighbourhoods (i.e. the top 5% by NFVI) the contribution from Northern Ireland 500 
increases substantially to 10% of UK EAD.   501 
These headline figures however mask the risks faced by individuals.  When normalised by 502 
population across the four countries, those living in flood prone areas in Scotland are set to 503 
experience the highest EAD per person (on average, £113 per person) and over double that 504 
of England (on average, £50 per person) - Supplementary Figure S12.  When considered by 505 
flood source, the highest EADs are experienced in fluvial (£97 per person) and coastal (£76 506 
per person) floodplains (in areas prone to surface water flooding we found the value to be 507 
much less at £16 per person).  In many cases, these estimates change little between more 508 
and less socially vulnerable neighbourhoods, except in Wales where the most vulnerable 509 
neighbourhoods (5% by NFVI) are exposed to significantly lower risk (on average, £40 per 510 
person) compared to the average in Wales (£60 per person).   511 
Lower incomes (~£7,500 per head in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods compared 512 
to~£10,500 on average) and low levels of contents insurance penetration (~40% of 513 
homeowners and 25% of tenants compared to the national average of ~75%) mean the 514 
relative impact of a flood is higher in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods that elsewhere.  515 
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This is reflected in the substantial increase in ‘relative economic pain’ (introduced above) 516 
with socially vulnerability.  In areas prone to coastal/tidal flooding, for example, the most 517 
socially vulnerable neighbourhoods (5% by NFVI) experience over twice the average ‘relative 518 
economic pain’ (Sayers et al, 2017).  In fluvial floodplains, the ‘relative economic pain’ is 519 
three times higher than the average.   520 
In the future 521 
The EADs associated with flooding are set to rise (from £351 million today, residential direct 522 
damages only, to £1.1 billion by the 2080s, assuming a +4oC climate future, high population 523 
growth and a continuation of current levels of adaptation).  At a UK scale the increase in 524 
EAD in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods (defined by top 20% by NFVI) is, in general, in 525 
line with this overall increase; rising from £81 million today to £250 million by the 2080s 526 
(slightly greater than 20%).  This is not the case in Scotland however, where the analysis 527 
suggests the contribution to EAD from the 20% most vulnerable neighbourhoods increases 528 
from 22% today to 29% by the 2080s.   529 
The disproportionality in the risks faced by socially vulnerable neighbourhoods in coastal 530 
areas experienced today persists into the future (with substantial increases in risks 531 
experienced across all neighbourhoods).  With fluvial and surface water flood risk the 532 
pattern of disproportionality in EAD also remains largely as today.  When income and 533 
insurance are considered, the increase in EAD translates to significant increases in the REP 534 
across the UK and for all sources of flooding, particularly for the most vulnerable 535 
neighbourhoods. 536 
City regions in economic decline, deprivation and flood disadvantage 537 
The situation today  538 
At a UK scale, urban settings dominate flood risk, accounting for £264 million (75%) of 539 
present day EAD and 5.2 million (82%) of the people exposed to flooding.  When considered 540 
from the perspective of socially vulnerable neighbourhoods (the top 20% by NFVI) the flood 541 
risks in rural neighbourhoods are however more significant, accounting for 45% of the total 542 
£47 million EAD and 30% of the people exposed to flooding (Supplementary Figure S13). 543 
The relationship between deprivation and flood disadvantage is also striking.  Sixteen of the 544 
24 city regions classed as in relative economic decline by Pike et al. (2016) experience levels 545 
of flood disadvantage above the UK average.  This reflects a combination of influences but 546 
from the perspective of the analysis here is driven by higher than average levels of social 547 
vulnerability (as shown by the NFVI in those cities) and a greater than average number of 548 
people exposed to a frequent flood (in Glasgow, for example, those living in the floodplain 549 
are almost twice as likely to experience frequent flooding than the UK average).  When 550 
income and insurance penetration are considered, the REP associated with flooding is 551 
significantly higher in these sixteen cities, reflecting the lower levels of income (on average) 552 
and lower levels of insurance (Figure 3). 553 
This connection is, in part, recognised within government policy.  The UK government, for 554 
example, collects data on deprivation across a range of domains (including income, health, 555 
housing quality, availability of services).  These are combined into an Index of Multiple 556 
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Deprivation (the IMD – introduced earlier) and used across government to understand the 557 
distribution of social inequalities associated with a neighbourhood and to inform resources 558 
allocation.  Although IMD is not however a measure of ‘flood social vulnerability’ per se, 559 
flood vulnerability (as defined by the NFVI) is much higher in deprived areas (as defined by 560 
the Index of Multiple Deprivation, IMD) and increases in line with the IMD (Supplementary 561 
Figure S14).  This, of course, is to be expected as the NFVI and the IMD seek to express 562 
similar characteristics of a neighbourhood (although the NFVI is focused on those 563 
characteristics that make a neighbourhood ‘flood vulnerable’ rather than the more general 564 
expression of deprivation provided by the IMD).  This distinction between the general 565 
measure of deprivation, given by the IMD, and the more specific expression of social 566 
vulnerability to flooding, as expressed by the NFVI, is important as flood risk in socially 567 
vulnerable areas (defined by the NFVI) is consistently greater than that in deprived areas 568 
(defined by the IMD).  This suggests that the IMD fails properly to identify those areas that 569 
are at greatest flood disadvantage.  The underlying reasons for this are difficult to 570 
determine without further research (and have not be explored further here); however, 571 
given the role of the IMD in FRM policy across the UK (including supporting the 572 
identification of investment priorities in England through the FDGiA) these differences may 573 
be significant and question if IMD is an appropriate measure for use in the FRM context.   574 
Future risks 575 
In deprived neighbourhoods (as defined by the IMD) flood risk tends to increase in line with 576 
increases shown elsewhere.  The focus on ‘deprivation’ however highlights the importance 577 
of income, and its influence in insurance penetration, in increasing the relative economic 578 
pain experienced by those flooded and is reflected in significant increases in REP into the 579 
future in the most deprived areas. 580 
The greatest increases are seen in major and minor conurbations (experiencing an increase 581 
in EAD of 200% and 350% under a +2oC and +4oC climate future respectively) and rural 582 
towns and fringes in a sparse setting (increasing by 200% and 400%).  In these settings, the 583 
most socially vulnerable neighbourhoods experience slightly higher percentage increases in 584 
risk when compared to less vulnerable neighbourhoods.  This suggests that most vulnerable 585 
neighbourhoods in more dispersed settings (both urban and rural) may be particularly 586 
difficult to address within the current approach to adaptation and investment frameworks.   587 
Long-term investment in England:  Evidence for greater investment in vulnerable 588 
neighbourhoods 589 
The Long-term Investment Scenarios (LTIS) published by the Environment Agency (2014a) 590 
explore the long-term investment case for reducing flood risk (in England) based on 591 
optimising the Net Present Value of the different investment choices, using a simplified set 592 
of policy options from ‘do nothing’ to ‘improve +’ with a time horizon stretching through to 593 
2100 (Supplementary Table S3).  In doing so, LTIS considers costs and benefits but without 594 
any consideration of either who pays or the FDGiA rules that seek to positively discriminate 595 
in favour of the protection of deprived households (Defra, 2011).  In this context, the LTIS 596 
investment analysis is based on the principle of ‘utility’, and although it does not attempt to 597 
set out priority short-term investments, the LTIS does set the long-term direction of travel.  598 
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The investment scenario which maximises the Net Present Value over the 100-year period is 599 
referred to as the “optimised investment scenario” (Environment Agency 2014).  The 600 
analysis presented in the CCRA of the LTIS policy choices (Sayers et al., 2015) is extended 601 
here to explore the impact on risk in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods. 602 
The results suggest that there is a strong case for improving the protection afforded to 603 
socially vulnerable neighbourhoods (with nearly 55% of properties assigned an Improve or 604 
Improve+ policy option in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods, defined by the top by 5% 605 
NFVI, compared to c.35% on average; as illustrated by Supplementary Figure S15 that shows 606 
the percentage of residential property exposed to frequent flooding (i.e. a return period of 607 
1:75 years or less) that, under the optimised investment scenario, are assigned to each LTIS 608 
policy option).  Residential properties in socially vulnerable neighbourhoods are also less 609 
likely to be assigned a ‘do nothing’ or a ‘maintain crest’ policy choice - indicating possible 610 
deteriorating or no change in protection standards - when compared to residential 611 
properties on average (c.48% compared to 61%).  These results suggest that there is a direct 612 
long-term economic case for greater investment in FRM in vulnerable neighbourhoods, 613 
although this is an inference that which will need to be explored further in future research. 614 
Conclusions 615 
The research reported here reinforces the inability of existing metrics to properly capture 616 
the differential nature of the risks faced in more and less socially vulnerable communities.  617 
To overcome these deficiencies three new metrics are introduced to be used alongside 618 
existing metrics.  Firstly, a Neighbourhood Flood Vulnerability Index (NFVI) is shown to 619 
provide an improved expression of flood social vulnerability and is put forward as a 620 
replacement for the Index of Multiple Deprivation in FRM decision making.  Secondly, the 621 
Social Flood Risk Index (SFRI) provides a combined expression of probability, exposure and 622 
vulnerability that enables flood risks in one neighbourhood to be compared with another in 623 
a way that explicitly accounts for social vulnerability.  The thirdly, Relative Economic Pain 624 
(REP) index: by accounting for the influence of lower income levels and lowers levels of 625 
flood insurance the REP better reflects the experience of a given economic flood loss in 626 
more and less vulnerable neighbourhoods.  627 
Based on these new metrics, and exploring our two research questions, the results highlight 628 
clusters of geographic flood disadvantage across the UK, with 50% of most socially 629 
vulnerable people exposed to flooding living in just ten local authorities.  The results also 630 
highlight the systemic flood disadvantage experienced by those living in socially vulnerable 631 
neighbourhoods.  For example, in economically struggling cities, coastal floodplains and 632 
dispersed rural communities the most socially vulnerable often experience levels of 633 
Expected Annual Damages above the average.  When income and insurance penetration are 634 
considered (as represented by the REP index) the disproportionality in the risks faced is 635 
even more stark.  This highlights the central role that lower incomes and lower levels of 636 
insurance penetration play in systemically disadvantaging the most socially vulnerable 637 
communities.  Yet these communities contain people and households that are the least 638 
likely to be able to help themselves when flooded. 639 
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The spatial patterns of geographic disadvantage continue into the future with flood risks 640 
increasing for many neighbourhoods as a function of their geography (for example, 641 
assuming a continuation of current levels of adaptation the majority of communities at the 642 
coast experience significant increases in risk due to sea level rise). There is however a 643 
disproportional increase in flood risk faced by the most socially vulnerable. This acts to 644 
increase the systemic flood disadvantage and reflects the legacy of past investment and 645 
planning decisions, but is primarily influenced by the constraints on adaptation experienced 646 
by the socially vulnerable at both an individual and community level (including the limited 647 
capacity to make local contributions to the costs of FRM interventions, if such contributions 648 
are necessary).   649 
Through re-examination of the optimised investment scenario in England within the Long-650 
Term Investment Scenarios (Environment Agency, 2014) the research presented here 651 
reveals a strong long term economic case for improving the protection afforded to socially 652 
vulnerable communities (although the reasons for this future investment bias towards 653 
deprived areas are as yet unclear).  Whatever the reason, it would appear there is a 654 
utilitarian argument for reducing the risk in the most vulnerable communities as well as a 655 
Rawlsian one.  It is also clear that income (and consequently health, as in our NFVI but not in 656 
the IMD) are central drivers in flood vulnerability and are directly influenced by broader 657 
planning and economic development policy.  Flood risk management investment should be 658 
geared up by supporting multiple parallel government and private sector funding streams.  659 
In England for example, the FDGiA process could be reconfigured to better support 660 
economic regeneration, for example in economically struggling city regions (highlighted 661 
here as centres of geographic flood disadvantage). 662 
Many uncertainties remain and the results presented here will need continued research to 663 
better understand the root causes of flood vulnerability and disadvantage and how best to 664 
address them.  This paper presents only a first step towards quantifying social justice 665 
dimensions in FRM, but already clearly highlights the systemic flood disadvantage that exists 666 
and the need to prioritise the most socially vulnerably if FRM is to deliver fair outcomes in 667 
the future (not least in response to climate change).  To do so will require a greater 668 
emphasis to be placed on Rawlsian approaches alongside issues of utility and equality.  669 
Significant further research however will be needed to evaluate the ability of FRM policy, 670 
and broader spatial and economic policies, to deliver such outcomes.   671 
Acknowledgements 672 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the funding provided by the Joseph Rowntree 673 
Foundation (Katharine Knox) through their support of our research into flood resilience in 674 
disadvantaged communities (Sayers et al., 2017) that forms the basis of this paper. The 675 
assistance of Jessie Fieth is also acknowledged. 676 
677 
18 
 
References 678 
Bouwer LM, Bubeck P, Aerts JC (2010). Changes in future flood risk due to climate and 679 
development in a Dutch polder area.  Global Environmental Change 20(3): 463-471. 680 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.04.002 681 
Cutter, S.  L., Burton, C.  G., & Emrich, C.  T.  (2010).  Disaster resilience indicators for 682 
benchmarking baseline conditions.  Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 683 
Management, 7(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.2202/1547-7355.1732 684 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) (2011). Flood and coastal 685 
resilience partnership funding: Defra policy statement on an outcome-focused, partnership 686 
approach to funding flood and coastal erosion risk management.  Defra, London 687 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) (2013). Flood and Coastal 688 
Resilience Partnership Funding.  Defra, London  689 
DCLG (2015).  The English Indices of Deprivation.  London, Department for Communities and 690 
Local Government 691 
Environment Agency (2009).  Flooding in England.  Environment Agency, Bristol 692 
Environment Agency (2014). Long-term Investment Scenarios (LTIS).  Published by the 693 
Environment Agency 694 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/381939/FCRM_Long_term_investment_scenarios.pdf Accessed 03/03/2016 695 
Evans E P, Ashley R, Hall J, Penning-Rowsell E C, Sayers P, Thorne C, Watkinson A (2004a). 696 
Foresight: future flooding (Vol 1).  Future risks and their drivers. London, Published by the 697 
Office of Science and Technology. 698 
Evans E P, Ashley R, Hall J, Penning-Rowsell E C, Saul A, Sayers P, Thorne C, Watkinson A 699 
(2004b). Foresight: future flooding (Vol 2).  Managing future risks. London, Published by 700 
Office of Science and Technology. 701 
Hall JW, Dawson RJ, Sayers P, Rosu C, Chatterton JB, Deakin R (2003).  A methodology for 702 
national-scale flood risk assessment.  Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers - 703 
Water & Maritime Engineering 156(3): 235-247. DOI 10.1234/12345678. 704 
Hallegatte.  S., Bangalore, M.  and Vogt-Schilb, A.  (2016). Assessing Socioeconomic 705 
Resilience to Floods in 90 Countries.  World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 7663.  706 
Accessed June 2017.  http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/387821467309551281/pdf/WPS7663.pdf Accessed June 2017 707 
HM Treasury (2003).  The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government.  708 
Published by HMSO, London. 709 
Johnson C, Penning-Rowsell EC, Parker DJ (2007). Natural and imposed injustices: the 710 
challenges in implementing ‘fair’ flood risk management policy in England.  Geographical 711 
Journal 173(4): 374-390. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4959.2007.00256.x 712 
Kazmierczak A, Cavan G, Connelly A, Lindley S (2015). Mapping Flood Disadvantage in 713 
Scotland 2015.  The Scottish Government, Edinburgh 714 
19 
 
Kind, J., Botzen, W., and Aerts, J (2017).  Accounting for risk aversion, income distribution 715 
and social welfare in cost-benefit analysis for flood risk management.  WIREs Climate 716 
Change 2017, 8:e446.  DOI: 10.1002/wcc.446 717 
Klijn F, van Buuren M, and van Rooij SA (2004). Flood-risk management strategies for an 718 
uncertain future: living with Rhine river floods in the Netherlands? AMBIO: A Journal of the 719 
Human Environment 33(3): 141-147. https://doi.org/10.1579/0044-7447-33.3.141 720 
Klijn F, de Bruijn KM, Knoop J, Kwadijk J (2012). Assessment of the Netherlands’ flood risk 721 
management policy under global change.  Ambio 41(2): 180-192. 722 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-011-0193-x 723 
Kwakkel JH, Pruyt E (2013). Exploratory Modeling and Analysis, an approach for model-724 
based foresight under deep uncertainty.  Technological Forecasting and Social Change 80(3): 725 
419-431. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2012.10.005 726 
Lindley S, O’Neill J, Kandeh J, Lawson N, Christian R, O’Neill M (2011) Climate change, justice 727 
and vulnerability.  Published by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York 728 
Money.co.uk (2017). Is now the time to ditch your landline? Accessed at: 729 
http://www.money.co.uk/landlines/is-now-the-time-to-ditch-your-landline.htm.  March 730 
2017 731 
Nada-Rajah R (2010). Stories of Environmental Justice.  Banbury, Published by the Artists 732 
Project Earth 733 
National Flood Forum (2012). Property level protection and insurance.  Published by the 734 
National Flood Forum, Bewdley. 735 
National Flood Forum (2016).  Barriers to property level protection.  Published by the 736 
National Flood Forum, Bewdley. 737 
Penning-Rowsell EC (2014). What do the 2013/14 floods tell us about overall flood risk in 738 
England and Wales? Circulation121:3-5: The Newsletter of The British Hydrological Society. 739 
Penning-Rowsell EC (2015). A realistic assessment of fluvial and coastal flood risk in England 740 
and Wales.  Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 40(1): 44-61. DOI: 741 
10.1111/tran.12053 742 
Penning-Rowsell EC (2016). Is national AAD really only £93m-to-£116m, rather than £1.3bn? 743 
Circulation, 131: 14-15: The Newsletter of The British Hydrological Society. 744 
Penning-Rowsell, E.C., Priest, S.J.  and King, D., 2016.  Flood risk management and “fairness”: 745 
aspirations and reality.  In E3S Web of Conferences (Vol.  7, p.  24001).  EDP Sciences. 746 
https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/20160724001 747 
Pike A, MacKinnon D, Coombes M, Champion T, Bradley D, Cumbers A, Robson L, Wymer C 748 
(2016).  Uneven growth: tackling city decline.  Published by the Joseph Rowntree 749 
Foundation, York. 750 
20 
 
Pitt, M (2007).  The Pitt Review: Learning lessons from the 2007 floods - Full Report.  751 
Published by Cabinet Office, 22 Whitehall, London 752 
Robotham (2016).  Mapping Flood Disadvantage in York: Risk, Vulnerability, and the Role of 753 
Social Capital.  Submitted in partial fulfilment of the MSc in Water Science, Policy and 754 
Management, University of Oxford. 755 
Sayers, PB.  (2017).  Evolution of Strategic Flood Risk Management in Support of Social 756 
Justice, Ecosystem Health, and Resilience.  Published by Oxford Research Encyclopedia: 757 
Natural Hazard Science. DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780199389407.013.85 758 
Sayers, P.B., Li Yuanyuan, Moncrieff, C, Li Jianqiang, Tickner, D., Xu Xiangyu, Speed, R., Li 759 
Aihua, Lei Gang, Qiu Bing, Wei Yu and Pegram G. (2016). Drought Risk Management: A 760 
strategic approach. Published in 2016 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 761 
Cultural Organization 7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07SP, France © UNESCO 2016 ISBN 762 
978-92-3-1000942. 763 
Sayers PB, Galloway G, Penning-Rowsell EC, Shen F, Wen K, Chen Y, Le Quesne T (2014). 764 
Strategic flood management: ten ‘golden rules’ to guide a sound approach.  Journal: 765 
International Journal of River Basin Management.  DOI: 10.1080/15715124.2014.902378 766 
Sayers PB, Panzeri M, Rosu, Kemp J, Deakin R, Neve P, Bodilly A, Hall J, Dawson R, 767 
Chatterton JB (2002).  National Flood Risk Assessment 2002.  HR Wallingford Report EX 4722 768 
for the Environment Agency.  http://www.sayersandpartners.co.uk/uploads/6/2/0/9/6209349/nafra_-_2002_-_ex4722_-769 
_national_risk_flood_assessment.pdf Accessed June 2017 770 
Sayers, P.B., Horritt, M., Penning Rowsell, E., and Fieth, J (2017).  Present and future flood 771 
vulnerability, risk and disadvantage: A UK assessment.  A report for the Joseph Rowntree 772 
Foundation published by Sayers and Partners LLP.   Accessible here http://www.sayersandpartners.co.uk/flood-773 
disadvantage.html 774 
Sayers PB, Lamb R, Panzeri M, Bowman H, Hall J, Horritt M, Penning-Rowsell EC (2016). 775 
Believe it or not? The challenge of validating large scale probabilistic risk models.  776 
Proceedings of Floodrisk2016.  E3S Web Conf., 7 (2016) 11004 DOI: 777 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/20160711004  778 
Sayers PB, Horritt MS, Penning-Rowsell EC, Mckenzie A (2015). Climate Change Risk 779 
Assessment 2017: Projections of future flood risk in the UK.  Main Report, Appendix A 780 
Supporting data sets, Appendix E Individual adaptation measures, and Appendix F: The 781 
Future Flood Explorer Overview.  A Sayers and Partners LLP report for the Committee on 782 
Climate Change.  https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/sayers-for-the-asc-projections-of-future-flood-risk-in-the-uk/ accessed 9/11/16 783 
Sayers PB, Hall JW, Meadowcroft IC (2002).  Towards risk-based flood hazard management 784 
in the UK.  Civil Engineering 2002, 150(5), 36-42. DOI/10.1680/cien.2002.150.5.36 785 
Sen A (1992). Inequality re-examined.  University of Oxford: Published by the Clarendon 786 
Press. 787 
Tapsell S M, Penning-Rowsell E C, Tunstall S M, Wilson T L (2002). Vulnerability to flooding: 788 
health and social dimensions.  Flood risk in a changing climate Philosophical Transactions of 789 
21 
 
The Royal Society, Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 360: 1511–1525. DOI: 790 
10.1098/rsta.2002.1013 791 
Thrush D, Burningham K, Fielding J (2005).  Flood Warning for Vulnerable Groups: Measuring 792 
& Mapping Vulnerability.  Published by Defra/Environment Agency, Flood and coastal 793 
erosion risk management R&D Programme. 794 
Twigger-Ross C, Kashefi E, Weldon S, Brooks K, Deeming H, Forrest S, Fielding J, Gomersall A, 795 
Harries T, McCarthy S, Orr P, Parker DJ, Tapsell S (2014). Flood Resilience Community 796 
Pathfinder Evaluation: Rapid Evidence Assessment.  Published by Defra, London. 797 
van Alphen, J.  (2014).  The Delta Programme and updated flood risk management policies in 798 
the Netherlands.  Proceeding of the 6th International conference on flood management.  799 
Sao Paulo, Brazil.   800 
Walker, G.  and Burningham, K.  (2011). Flood Risk, Vulnerability and Environmental Justice: 801 
evidence and evaluation of inequality in a UK context Critical Social Policy.  31, 2, p.  216-802 
240. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018310396149  803 
804 
22 
 
Figures 805 
Figure 1 The Neighbourhood Flood Vulnerability Index (NFVI): Influential characteristics 806 
and indicators 807 
Figure 2 Present day: Concentration of people living in flood prone areas 808 
Figure 3 City regions in Relative Decline: Relative Economic Pain of flooding 809 
Tables 810 
Table 1 Neighbourhood Flood Vulnerability Index: Indicators and supporting variables 811 
Supplementary Figures 812 
Supplementary Figure S1 An understanding of vulnerability, risk, and uncertainty is 813 
needed to make informed choices (Sayers et al., 2016). 814 
Supplementary Figure S2 Exogenous change: Climate change and population growth 815 
Supplementary Figure S3 Endogenous change: A portfolio of adaptation measures are 816 
considered (after Evans et al, 2004a&b; Sayers et al, 2014). 817 
Supplementary Figure S4 The basic framework of the analysis of risk and flood 818 
disadvantage 819 
Supplementary Figure S5 Indicators of social flood resilience and disadvantage 820 
Supplementary Figure S6 Neighbourhood Impact Curve: Example relationship return 821 
period v impact used within the FFE (after Sayers et al., 2015) 822 
Supplementary Figure S7 Calculation of the Neighbourhood Flood Vulnerability Index 823 
(NFVI) 824 
Supplementary Figure S8 Present day: Drivers of neighbourhood vulnerability at the coast 825 
(see Table 1) 826 
Supplementary Figure S9 Future change: Floodplain population: By country 827 
Supplementary Figure S10 Future change: Exposure to frequent flooding: By source 828 
Supplementary Figure S11 Present day: Contribution to Expected Annual Damages (By 829 
country) 830 
Supplementary Figure S12 Present day: Expected Annual Damages: Individual (By country) 831 
Supplementary Figure S13 Present day: A comparison of flood risk in rural and urban 832 
settings 833 
Supplementary Figure S14 Present day: A comparison of risks in deprived and vulnerable 834 
neighbourhoods 835 
Supplementary Figure S15 Percentage of residential properties in areas receiving a 836 
particular policy choice 837 
23 
 
Supplementary tables 838 
Supplementary Table S1 Present day: Population of flood prone areas 839 
 Supplementary Table S2 Present day: People exposed to frequent flooding (1:75 years or 840 
more frequent) 841 
Supplementary Table S3 The LTIS policy options (from Long Term Investment Strategy 842 
(LTIS) Improvements – Part 1 Technical Documentation, June 2014, Environment Agency 843 
(2014)) 844 



Table 1 Neighbourhood Flood Vulnerability Index: Indicators and supporting variables 
Indicator Supporting variables 
Age a1 Young children (% people under 5 years) 
  a2 Older people (% people over 75 years) 
Health 
h1 
Disability / people in ill-health (% people whose day- to-day 
activities are limited) 
  
h2 
Households with at least one person with long-term limiting 
illness (%) 
Income i1 Unemployed (% unemployed) 
  
i2 
Long-term unemployed (% who are long-term unemployed or 
who have never worked) 
  
i3 
Low income occupations (% in routine or semi-routine 
occupations) 
  
i4 
Households with dependent children and no adults in 
employment (%) 
  i5 People income deprived (%) 
Information use 
f1 
Recent arrivals to UK (% people with <1-year residency coming 
from outside UK) 
  f2 Level of proficiency in English 
Local knowledge k1 New migrants from outside the local area (%) 
Tenure t1 Private renters (% Households) 
  t2 Social renters (% households renting from social landlords) 
Physical mobility 
  
  
m1 High levels of disability (% disabled) 
m2 People living in medical and care establishments (%) 
m3 Lack of private transport (% households with no car or van) 
Crime c1 High levels of crime  
Housing 
characteristics 
hc1 
Caravan or other mobile or temporary structures in all 
households (%) 
Direct flood 
experience 
e1 
No.  of properties exposed to significant flood risk (%) 
(acts to reduce social vulnerability) 
Service availability 
  
  
  
s1 Emergency services exposed to flooding (%) 
s2 Care homes exposed to flooding (%) 
s3 GP surgeries exposed to flooding (%) 
s4 Schools exposed to flooding (%) 
Social networks 
(non-flood) 
n1 Single-pensioner households (%) 
n2 Lone-parent households with dependent children (%) 
n3 
Children of primary school age (4-11) in the population (%) (acts 
to reduce social vulnerability) 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
 
Supplementary Table S1 Present day: Population of flood prone areas 
  
  
All 
neighbourhoods 
(000s) 
Vulnerable neighbourhoods (000s) 
Top 20% by 
NFVI 
Top 10% by 
NFVI 
Top 5% by 
NFVI 
By country 
UK 6,398 1,497 23% 802 13% 419 7% 
England 5,508 1,216 22% 635 12% 316 6% 
Wales 378 107 28% 45 12% 13 3% 
Scotland 376 74 20% 56 15% 32 8% 
Northern Ireland 136 74 55% 52 38% 37 27% 
By flood source 
All sources 6,398 1,497 23% 802 13% 419 7% 
Coastal (and tidal) 1,809 604 33% 340 19% 179 10% 
Surface water 2,869 594 21% 293 10% 148 5% 
Fluvial 1,720 299 17% 155 9% 71 4% 
 
  
Supplementary Table S2 Present day: People exposed to frequent flooding (1:75 years or 
more frequent) 
  
All neighbourhoods 
(000s) 
Vulnerable neighbourhoods (000s) 
  
Top 20% by 
NFVI 
Top 10% by 
NFVI 
Top 5% by 
NFVI 
By country  
UK 1,985 1,333 67% 239 12% 122 6% 
England 1,612 1,216 75% 174 11% 88 5% 
Wales 117 36 30% 15 13% 4 3% 
Scotland 200 51 26% 29 15% 17 9% 
Northern Ireland 55 29 53% 20 35% 14 25% 
By flood source  
All sources 1,985 451 23% 239 12% 122 6% 
Coastal (and tidal) 489 164 33% 95 19% 50 10% 
Surface water 870 103 12% 52 6% 24 3% 
Fluvial 626 184 29% 92 15% 48 8% 
 
 
  
Supplementary Table S3 The LTIS policy options (from Long Term Investment Strategy (LTIS) 
Improvements – Part 1 Technical Documentation, June 2014, Environment Agency (2014)) 
Policy Option Change to expenditure Change to risk 
Do Nothing  Passive assets1: no expenditure 
on maintenance or replacement 
of passive flood risk 
management assets   
Active assets: not included in 
expenditure 
Passive assets degrade and fail over a 
short period of time.  The level of 
flood risk will increase quickly over 
time as assets fail.  Non-operation of 
active assets increases risk on the 
very short term  
Maintain crest 
level 
Maintain and replace current 
flood risk management assets to 
their existing crest levels   
The level of flood risk will increase 
over time due to climate change. 
Maintain 
current flood 
risk 
Maintain current flood risk 
management assets, replace 
with larger/longer/more robust 
structures.  Build new assets  
The level of flood risk will remain 
static as the size of defences keeps 
pace with climate change 
Improve Maintain and replace current 
flood risk management assets.  
Assets to be replaced with 
larger/longer/more robust 
structures.  Build new assets 
The level of flood risk reduces as 
assets are replaced with ones that 
offer a better standard of protection 
Improve+ 
 
Maintain and replace current 
assets.  Assets to be replaced 
with larger/longer/more robust 
structures.  Build new assets 
The level of flood risk reduces as 
assets are replaced with ones that 
offer a better standard of protection 
 
 
 
                                                     
1
 The term “asset” here refers to any structure or other intervention that influences flood probability.  They are 
seen as assets as they have this valuable role (Sayers et al, 2015b). 
